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Abstract
This article tells the saga of the Hubble Space Telescope, and how the attempt to
overcome the restrictions Earths atmosphere imposes upon astronomy, came to
dominate the existence of NASA in the later part of the 20th century.This biography
of an object is told over four stages fundamental to the order of management; devel-
opment, failure, recovery and completion. With a failed mirror, what became hidden
and forgotten, was once more revealed. With the wild and uncertain dimension of
Hubble’s assemblage disclosing itself through malfunction, management was able to
rescue through repair its prior unavailability. Eventually management has contended
with Hubble’s demise as it fades out of view during the process of completion.
Running in counterpart to the four stages of Hubble’s life will be an explication of the
events using the work of Martin Heidegger, particularly his work and concepts of
Being and Time (Heidegger, 1962).
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Introduction
The aim of this article is to examine some of the key events in the life of the Hubble
Space Telescope; to show the pathway towards its failure but more notably, its recov-
ery and eventual success. The Space Telescope was to be NASA’s most sublime object
in space, having the potential to secure quasi-religious significance through its mis-
sion to unlock the secrets of the universe. During the course of Hubble’s working life
such grand ambitions were thrown into doubt when the inability of the telescope to
function properly turned it into the most ridiculed object on Earth, with one Senator
anointing it with the derogatory tag of a ‘techno turkey’. In particular the article
wishes to look at the relationship between Hubble and its management by NASA who
along with people from astronomers to astronauts, endured an oscillating relationship
between failure and success as the telescope struggled to fulfil its purpose and the
achievement of its scientific goals.
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What is to be managed has first to come into existence, and the opening
historical account will trace Hubble’s development stage. Under NASA as the pro-
gramme architect, a remarkable array of disparate strands were composed between
political patrons, private contractors, and worldwide astronomers, making the
Hubble Telescope’s Earth-bound stages of development an exemplar of how the
becoming of an object is managed into existence. The scientific mega-project of
Hubble captured a complexity of organizational life where management constantly
endured the spectre of failure with the abandonment of the Hubble Telescope often
on the projects horizon.
Approximately two months after launch, the Hubble Space Telescope Project
Manager declared there was a critical flaw in one or both of the mirrors in the Optical
Telescope Assembly, and this incident becomes the second part of the objects man-
agement history. Historical biographies can suddenly reappear, as previously forgot-
ten pieces of equipment return to the concern of management. Objects are often
implements taken for granted, existing in a vast subterranean backdrop supporting
the surface layer of practice and place of explicit management activity. Therefore
things often only come into the sight of management as technology comes into view
through malfunction. The broken mirror escaped the telescope’s assemblage, erupting
into the management landscape, and compelling the organization of NASA to take
stock of this new contingent realm. History is often made by failure, breakage or
fiasco. A mirror’s pathway into the totality of the technological system was disturbed
and made visible by its fault; creating a new ontological depth and enrolment of man-
agement attention. However, the chance of redemption for NASA came in the guise
of Hubble’s breakdown not being aberrant but as a normal condition of the object’s
existence (Petroski 1985). Here the third stage in the life of the object is the credit
NASA gained through recovery, which was not just a reactionary derivative of failure,
but an intended part of the objects biography; service was built into design. The
repair illustrated the importance of human space labour and ingenuity where man-
agement learning occurred through maintenance (Orr 1996); but it ostensibly allowed
NASA to regain credibility and capture the public imagination with televised record
breaking space walks displaying a new level of performance from astronauts. The con-
cluding episode in the biography of the Hubble Telescope examines its recent oscilla-
tion between worth and eventual demise. In this period, the value of an object is
inseparable from managerial motive. Throughout the lifespan of the telescope man-
agement strived to fend off decay through service, and failure through repair; eventu-
ally allowing NASA to decide and control the fate of its most sublime technological
object in space.
Coupled with this narrative, the article will call upon the work of Martin
Heidegger, specifically his most celebrated work Being and Time (1962) to help under-
stand the relationship between Hubble and its management. The four themes of
Hubble’s biography development, failure, recovery and demise will be accompanied
by a revision of these events through Heidegger’s philosophical concepts; the becoming
of an entity during its development; the disclosure and malfunction during the failure of
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a key piece of equipment; the recovery of this setback through coping with what has
been revealed; and finally the demise of Hubble which necessitates its releasement and
removal from the care of management.
Some of Heidegger’s richest contributions to philosophy are derived from his fun-
damental theoretical position of hermeneutic phenomenology; which calls into ques-
tion the traditional Cartesian belief of a separate process of mental cognition from the
subject to the object. Heidegger’s concept of phenomenology goes further than ‘to let
that which shows itself be seen’ (Heidegger 1962, 56), because Heidegger also wants
to observe that which is concealed, instead ‘it is something which is primarily and
usually does not show itself at all; it is something that lies hidden, in that which pri-
marily and usually does show itself’ (Heidegger 1962, 59). This twofold nature of an
object, that is both revealed and hidden, is central for this article and the events in the
story of Hubble.
The primacy that Heidegger affords Dasein (Human way of being) in his attempt to
unravel human reality – ultimately an attempt to make sense of being-in-the-world –
does not reduce the appeal his work holds for examining Hubble during the most
notable sequences of its existence. This is because Heidegger also emphasizes the cen-
trality of objects in relation to the nature of being and he suggests ‘entities are in every
case our preliminary and accompanying theme’ (Heidegger 1962, 95). Heidegger places
an importance on the constitutive entities that make up our background, what he
describes as the worldhood of the environment (environment is taken as the world of every-
day Dasein). Thus an interesting examination of management’s engagement with
Hubble can be founded upon an ontological interpretation of those entities that are
encountered within-the-environment and how they reveal themselves to management.
To explore this relationship of management and things that become available, the story
shall now begin with the development of Hubble and how it came in to existence, fol-
lowed by a Heideggerian interpretation of these events.
Development
In a bid to reduce the effects of turbulence in Earth’s atmosphere – which distorts the
image of celestial objects and causes them to flicker – astronomical observatories have
traditionally been built at high altitude. Driven by a desire to forge a closer relation-
ship with the objects of their investigation, a lucidity any enthusiast in their work
craves, astronomers began dreaming of ways to escape the confine of this optical
spoiler. The ambitions of aspirant astronomers were to be realized through the mate-
rialization of a project that covered the span of the 20th century; the construction on
earth and deployment in space of a telescope. Three distinct influences will now be
examined that allowed a space telescope to come into existence; ideas are context
dependant and to be realized have to occur in key junctures when historical events are
favourable. First astronomers in the academic community had to believe in the proj-
ect and be convinced of its merits. Second political patronage was required; as with
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most projects, there are always detractors and adversaries who have to be convinced of
its worth. Finally the technology had to exist to make science fiction into science fact.
It was the astronomer Lyman Spitzer who first committed the idea of a Space
Telescope to paper. In an audacious 1946 publication entitled the ‘Astronomical
Advantages of an Extra-terrestrial Observation’ (Spitzer 1990), he initially offered a
proposal for the development of a space telescope claiming ‘it would uncover new phe-
nomenon not yet imagined, and perhaps modify profoundly our basic concepts of
space time.’ (Zimmerman 2008, 11). Others before had shared his desire to transcend
Earth’s firmaments. Previous enterprising designs to exploit the inert and image
friendly environment of space had included the strapping of balloons to a scientific
payload and the science fiction fuelled fancy of moon telescopes. Although there were
certain bold aspects to the report for the time – the proposed space telescope being
three times bigger than anything ground based in existence – his proposal began to
forge crucial alliances that gave his idea momentum.
The delineation of Spitzer’s proposal into a government funded publication was
a significant translation of his vision into a material realm; imbued with the vigour
of substance, the idea could now forge a potential trajectory into design where the
dreams of astronomers could be realized. However the early stages of a projects life,
before prospective support is augmented, can contain its most unsettling moments
(Latour 1996) and the mutability of endorsement in the immediate period after the
Second World War demonstrated the capricious nature of an object residing in the
stages of conception. Spitzer’s ambitious thinking was greeted with derision from
colleagues who regarded the project ‘hazardous and probably undesirable’
(Zimmerman 2008, 15). This opposition continued in 1958 when the eminent
astronomer Fred Hoyle insisted ‘the cart was being put before the horse’ his belief
centred on the argument any orbiting observatory should be offered as an ancillary
to the space programme, and not become the principal figure, complaining further
the case for space based observation had been ‘promulgated with almost Madison
Avenue techniques’ (Zimmerman 2008, 20). Such opposition from within one’s own
community was a difficult obstacle for the project to surmount. Colleagues may have
been unconvinced of its merit but their opposition was rendered insignificant against
the development of a more serious political concern; an object in space not of
America’s making.
It took a day in history to finally politically charge the space telescope project –
indeed the necessary spur for the entirety of the US space programme – with the
impetus for the objects subsequent naissance; the appearance of Sputnik 1 in the night
sky. The Soviets foray into space with the first space satellite and surrounding hyste-
ria, administered a vitalizing effect to the US space programme; leading to the for-
mation of NASA in 1958. The earlier tenuous proposal of Spitzer’s astro-observatory
now not only received support from the scientific community, who were buoyed by
the promises coming from America’s new space agency and their support for space
bound projects, but additionally in the light of a new political epoch ushering in the
space race, the added weight of Congressional support.
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Scientific discovery played a crucial part in America’s war efforts and with huge
undertakings such as the Manhattan project the era of ‘Big Science’ (Weinberg
1961) was marshalled in. Before these fiscal extravaganzas, the practices associated
with scientific discovery had generally developed from the solitary pursuits of one
man and his laboratory. Science on the scale the world was about to witness would
no longer be left to the fortunes of an individual; everything would be massively
scaled up. The new projects of ‘Big Science’, which conducted huge scientific enter-
prises, required the collaboration of groups derived from the mobilization of
immense levels of labour and resources. The postwar rise of the Soviet Union meant
the ultimate viability of America’s political ideology rested upon the existence of
new projects with sufficient scope and endeavour to bestow a sense of awe around
their achievement.
Sputnik posed a great challenge … As a foreign threat with military
overtones, it was clearly the government’s business. As a blow to U.S.
credibility, it seemed to demand a response in kind. As a technocratic
accomplishment, involving the integration of science and engineering under
the aegis of the state, it called into question the assumptions behind U.S.
military, economic, and educational policy – every means by which the
mobilization of brainpower is achieved. (McDougall 1997, 139)
Once the project received NASA’s official stamp of approval and roused by the necessary
groups on board, one final obstacle lay in wait – money from Congress. The budgetary
demands of the Apollo mission, which cast a shadow over the telescopes project, meant
competing space programmes vied for a diminished amount of funding. In 1974, using
the fiscal logic provided by a renewed focus on ‘earthy problems’ (Zimmerman 2008, 57)
Congress voted to deny the necessary funding, thus threatening the very existence of the
telescope, long before any mirror had been polished, and consigning its existence to the
passages of history.
An emphatic riposte from astronomers was required and what followed was the
coordination of a lobbying effort to reassign the telescope its rightful path. Eventually
the Senate rescinded its efforts to dull the hopes of astronomers and eventually
approved funding of US$36m as an initial sum to allow work to begin in earnest with
1983 as the provisional year of launch (Smith 1989). With this funding commitment,
the growing status and complexity of the project also brought increased fragmenta-
tion, detracting from its chances of existence. A dramatis personae gradually coalesced
around the Space Telescope Project; but this coming together was not always harmo-
nious. Although NASA was the overall programme architect its organizational struc-
ture encouraged rivalry between different groups. Competition between the Space
Centres of Marshall and Goddard for power and resources lacked any of the necessary
coalition building between institutions to make the project a success. In the end
Marshall succeeded in the award to construct the Space Telescope, while Goddard had
to settle for the lesser role of constructing the necessary scientific instrumentation
(Dunar and Waring 1999, 56). Among a host of contractors the Perkin-Elmer
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Corporation undertook the precision work of constructing the telescopes mirrors; a
decision that in the fullness of time would have untold consequences.
Finally in 1983 the telescope was given its name, the now familiar Hubble, after
the astronomer Edwin Hubble. The naming of an object plays an important role in its
obduracy, where it acquires a certain anthropomorphic character and at this point the
future of Hubble appeared secure. However, its eventual launch would now suffer fur-
ther setback. Due to the Challenger disaster, work on Hubble entered a period of ces-
sation during which engineers were able to perform additional work on the existing
design. Management was forced to provide a specially adapted Earth bound home
where it was kept in storage for a number of years at a cost of US$6m per month
(Zimmerman 2008). If NASA had not endured the Challenger disaster the Hubble
Mission would have certainly been plagued by further problems. In any project addi-
tional time is often a gift where further upgrade and work is undertaken. The elapse
of time in this instance allowed further improvements to occur, making Hubble more
robust and ready for launch.
Becoming
This first episode in the life of Hubble concerns its becoming, not only how it came to
be, but also how it continually fluctuated into a state of (non)existence. Examining this
in the wider philosophical sense of Heidegger’s work, it is possible to understand the
development of Hubble as a process that is intrinsically temporal. Hubble in these
early stages was always becoming; its existence is one of movement, not in the sense of
shifting locations but changes in the security of its status and appearance as an entity.
The what it is and how it is of Hubble was defined by its very being as an entity
with a trajectory for ‘Heidegger’s topic is not at all some hypostasized ‘being’ but
rather movement’(Sheehan 1981, 536). Hubble had a role to perform for management
in becoming a working space telescope and its development was an odyssey to achieving
this goal. The awareness of purpose is what Heidegger terms absent-but-anticipated. In
the case of Dasein it is the interplay between the presence of its being-as-existence and
the absence-as-death. At this stage in Hubble’s history, its being as an entity in the pres-
ence, where it awaits its launch, is defined by the absent but anticipated goal of its
mission in space. So in this sense, even at the beginning of Hubble’s existence, its tra-
jectory is laid through its objectives, making the project always towards-its-end.
To understand the relationship between Hubble and management it is important
to look at the twofold nature of movement, that of hiddeness and disclosure. For
Heidegger the essence of any entity lies in the pathways of an autodisclosive process,
which is understood as its inexorable movement into appearance. What is important
for an interpretation of Hubble’s becoming is this disclosure only occurs in the pres-
ence of human existence – Dasein. Therefore what renders Hubble as an intelligible
entity and discovers its disclosive nature is management itself. The process of becoming
for Hubble is therefore a movement of disclosure to management.
EGAN: HUBBLE,TROUBLE,TOIL AND SPACE RUBBLE
269
Heidegger interpreted this disclosure as grounded in movement that he terms
‘temporality’. ‘Whoever builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals
what is to be brought forth. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that techne
is a bringing forth’ (Heidegger 1993, 319). The essence of management is to reveal,
to bring forth what had previously been hidden or awaiting discovery, and to imbue
a potential project with the necessary kinetic force to reveal its availableness. To
describe this force Heidegger uses a term Ereignis to denote movement as a process
that compels an entity into its final state of being. The initial account of Hubble’s
development has charted some of the relations that seem to draw the project forward
into the eventual entity of a telescope. The management of any enterprise is faced with
its own pull towards its eventual conclusion, a process of trying to become what it set
out to achieve in its successful completion. However the wants of management to suc-
ceed in a project are not guaranteed. The Space Telescope could have taken an alter-
nate course to the one management rendered, but paths which are not the interests of
management often lack the necessary impetus as they are never actualized into a
process of becoming. Significance in this story of Hubble can encapsulate the paths
where the potential failures have contributed to the objects history in parity with its
actual success; demonstrating the need to examine ‘the forces that could have seized
the thing but did not’ (Massumi 2003, 42). The story of the Space Telescope this arti-
cle is beginning to tell will hopefully show the history of an object is not just a tale
of its successful route to becoming, but also a documenting of the uncertain and
process nature of its existence where it ‘Resides in a condition of possible histories’
(Koselleck 1985, 271). The telling of this erraticism in the life of Hubble will now
continue and show how objects can become resistant to the chosen pathways of man-
agement. Parts of an assembled whole can become obscured from management view,
laying dormant until things go wrong when the addition of the user puts the telescope
to work. Hubble’s ability to bite back is then revealed as it asserts control over the
destiny of NASA’s management.
Failure
When it was launched in April 1990 the total cost of Hubble had reached a stagger-
ing US$2.5bn making it the most expensive scientific instrument ever assembled
(Smith 1989). There was inexorable quality to Hubble’s eventual take off for a number
of reasons. The project was undoubtedly besieged by a catalogue of disruptive inci-
dents, but these problems must be situated within the complexity of the telescope and
surrounding work practices where disruptive variables are a normal condition (Perrow
1999). The mutual support of its allies and organizational imperatives of NASA gave
it an unyielding momentum that compelled the object into space. Its potential worth
to humanity was too beguiling to tolerate any threat of abandonment; Hubble simply
had to be. However the hitherto ill-fated history of construction did notaugment
confidence about its deployment and no amount of testing could pacify worries on
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the ground. Scientists and engineers awaited the spectre of failure; something was
bound to go wrong. Setback is the inevitable part of space projects, the people
involved just hope faults are minor, not considerable. Once it was set free in space, a
watchful world was heavy with anticipation as its two solar arrays unfolded to capture
the energy source of the sun for power up; and as they unfolded so did the start of its
orbital tribulations.
Hubble juddered into action and then stopped, entering a safe mode of essential
operations only, and vicariously sending jitters across the emptiness of space back to
Earth. However, its working order could only be assessed with the attestation a token
image of a star could provide. An expectant media needed to be abated and NASA was
eager to vindicate its might; the fortunes of object and organization were sealed
together by a star light years away. When the telescope captured its initial image –
what astronomers call ‘first light’ – there was not the expected sharpness, but a star
with a peculiar circular haze. Immediately some astronomers recognized the cause of
such distortion. Among a host of malfunctions that occurred in the first few days of
orbit, NASA became a hostage of fortune to the flaws of this one particular disruptive
object. Hidden within the assemblage of the telescope, was the spherical aberration of
its mirror. Disillusion was confirmed approximately two months after launch, when
the Hubble Space Telescope Project Manager declared there was a critical flaw in one
or both of the mirrors in the Optical Telescope Assembly (Chaisson 1994). Such tech-
nical glitches are normal episodes in the life of space instrumentation. Echoing this
assertion a NASA test support manager claimed about the project ‘no matter how
much testing and research you do on a piece of hardware on the ground, there are some
things you just can’t do and so you have to make adjustments’ (Dunar and Waring
1999, 509). Until the technological object is switched on, management is forced to
invest it with trust, placing its faith in the objects resilience and crossing their fingers
to ward off disappointment. Management allowed pieces of equipment to become for-
gotten parts of labour, entering into a waiting game with the onus on the object to
make the first move, and ensnare the organization within the nightmare of its dra-
matic reappearance. Let us now trace the instance of the mirrors opening gambit
where a slender anomaly during its manufacture pierced the legitimacy of NASA’s
entire organizational existence.
The committee which was established to investigate the technical failure was able
to trace the history of the spherical aberration and reveal its error strewn production.
Technicians at Perkin-Elmer, the contractor who made the primary mirror had mis-
measured the precise position of a lens in the device and over polished its surface by
1/50th the width of a human hair (Allen 1990). What was so lamentable about this
blunder is the fact technicians had been aware of the mirrors flaw during testing and
instead of interpreting the erroneous test data as an indication of a potential fault, they
proceeded to discount this evidence preferring to account for any discrepancies by
pointing the finger at the data itself and calling into question its reliability. As with
the Challenger disaster of the same period the derivation of fault in the mirrors pro-
duction lay in the ‘normalization of deviance’ at NASA (Vaughn 1996). Management
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failed to account for things that went against the imperative of cost reduction, laying
the ground for malfunctioning things returning to make their presence felt and
remind management of past misdemeanours. Objects seem to have a dual quality of
being hidden from view when all is well, until they cause mischief for management
to rule over through malfunction. The article will now once more return to
Heidegger’s work to illuminate this episode of failure and twofold existence of things
which become the concern of management from a hidden realm.
Malfunction and disclosure
As the account of the faulty mirror has just demonstrated the qualities of an entity are
revealed during our concern or manipulation of it. In the case of Heidegger’s example –
that of a hammer – qualities are revealed when we take hold of it and put it to use.
Equipment can therefore have qualities that are ready to be put to use and become avail-
able to us, Heidegger terms this a readiness-to-hand (Zuhandenheit) ‘This kind of being
which equipment possesses – in which it manifests itself in its own right – we call
“readiness-to-hand”’ (Heidegger 1962, 98).
Heidegger wants to highlight incidents that allow us to glimpse at the world
‘What is it that makes this world light up’ (Heidegger 1962, 75). An important
aspect for understanding the narrative of Hubble’s malfunctioning mirror is that our
acquaintance with an entity is born from its failure; it is when they become unusable
that we gain knowledge of their existence. Heidegger develops three different modes
in which equipment becomes unusable; conspicuousness – when something is damaged;
obtrusiveness – something is missing; obstinacy – something stands in the way. For
Heidegger ‘we discover its unusability, however not by looking at it and establishing
its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it.
When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous’ (Heidegger
1962, 102). In Heidegger’s vocabulary the equipment that is the mirror becomes pres-
ence-at-hand (Vorhandenheit). The mode of conspiciousness has the function of bringing
to the fore the characteristic of presence-at-hand. The mirror was once part of the refer-
ential whole amongst a totality where it was ‘constantly sighted beforehand in circum-
spection’ (Heidegger 1962, 105), but when there is malfunction we are forced to
recognize the mirror for what it is ‘the assignment has been disturbed – when some-
thing is unusable for some purpose – then the assignment becomes explicit’
(Heidegger 1962, 105). Once breakdown has occurred ‘Pure presence-at-hand
announces itself in such equipment’ (Heidegger 1962, 103). The customary action is
now for repair where the equipment becomes available to us once more and reverts ‘to
the ready-to-hand of something with which one concerns oneself’ (Heidegger 1962, 103).
The broken mirror becomes presence-at-hand but the relation to the mirror once more
becomes ready-to–hand once it is under repair.
With the incident of the faulty mirror, ‘the drama of things themselves’ (Harman
2005) erupted into the view of management. With malfunction acquaintance was
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renewed with the forgotten mirror, which had become concealed as part of the referential
whole of the telescope, compelling management to engage with the consequences of
past mishandlings, averting attention to back to the crucial time frames of Hubble’s
construction; what had become hidden in the totality of Hubble’s equipmentality now
ruptured into view. The world of management is often peripheral to the actual work-
ings of equipment. It is only through failure that what was once a tangential piece of
equipment becomes the focus of an organizations full consideration. The fully assem-
bled Hubble takes on an essence of its own, becoming an autonomous object, sharing
the goals of management. When the blurred images are revealed for the first time, the
relationship between organization and object is disturbed; different circumstances are
thrust into the awareness of management, asking to be dealt with, a different man-
agement goal is now revealed, that of repair.
The mirror came into view through management’s concernful dealings ‘entities
become accessible when we put ourselves into the position of concerning ourselves
with them in some such way’ (Heidegger 1962, 96). It was not until the telescope was
pointed towards a constellation of stars and required to take an image that its fault
came into view. ‘We discover its unusability, however not by looking at it and estab-
lishing its properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we
use it’ (Heidegger 1962, 85). It is therefore difficult for management to be fully
expectant and therefore prepared for malfunction. Our primary interaction with
equipment comes from use, and in this sense it is not until the telescope is fully oper-
ational that things burst into management praxis and arrest the attention of NASA’s
organization. Heidegger suggests there are ready ways of coping with the disturbance,
and the next section will discuss NASA’s ways of coping with the faulty mirror;
through the serviceable nature of Hubble’s design and human endeavour in space.
Recovery
Hubble was the most astronaut friendly space craft ever flown. In its design engineers
inscribed a level of endurance into the object that provided an ability to cope with any
threats to disrupt its purpose and obviate potential failure. With an expected lifespan
of 15 years and possibly beyond, incorporating a serviceable nature into its design
would give the Hubble Telescope the opportunity to periodically adopt the incre-
mental advances in the technology of space instrumentation made back on Earth. In
a paper on the nature of repair Graham and Thrift (2007) sum up the need to design
things with a serviceable quality ‘To make something serviceable is to understand the
world is involved in a continuous dying that can only be fended off by constant repair
and maintenance’ (Graham and Thrift 2007, 6). This process of dying is also impor-
tant when considering our relation to objects. The continuous nature of dying is not
just human phenomena but one also shared by the material realm. The issue for man-
agement is how to plan in anticipation of what is to be expected and avoid the pitfalls
of ignorance. NASA went to extraordinary lengths to accommodate the possibility of
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failures and malfunctions. More than 16,000 photographs were taken of every square
inch of the spacecraft to ensure astronauts would not be taken aback during work. A
berthing dock was developed to keep the telescope steady during repair. Hand rails
and footholds were strategically placed around Hubble and every bolt was made the
same size to make the work of astronauts as effortless as possible (Chaisson 1994).
The unavoidable decline of Hubble’s operational capabilities made it a mandatory
requirement of management to anticipate malfunctions and plan for repair and main-
tenance; an expectant belief in breakdown gives management the chance to be famil-
iar with failure before it arrives. The management of space projects must comprehend
that failure and decline are omnipresent in complex systems. It is only through such
awareness that management can be ready and implement a recovery strategy of which
preparation and training are all important.
Traditional definitions of training have focused on ‘the effort to develop knowl-
edge, skills and attitudes through learning experiences to achieve an effective per-
formance in an activity’ (Garavan et al. 1995). One of the main purposes of space
mission training is to give astronauts a familiarity with the environment of space,
which became the setting for repair activities to Hubble. The workshop of space, its
conditions and the appenditures of the crafts astronauts traverse, created a series of
challenges to NASA and the astronauts because its conditions are literally not of our
world. NASA therefore relied on simulation to mimic the space environment and give
astronauts time for preparation and carefully choreograph the Extra Vehicle Activity
(EVA), described as ‘a ballet of bodies and three hundred tools’ (Dunar and Waring
1999, 28). A favoured way of reproducing the weightless effects of space is to conduct
training exercises in vacuum chambers or underwater. In preparation for the repair
mission, astronaut Storey Musgrove underwent a series of tests in a vacuum chamber
to rehearse the procedures that the repairs to Hubble would follow. After working for
four hours checking the performance of tools at temperatures of −170 degrees
Centigrade, Musgrove suffered the effects of such harsh conditions with severe frost
bite and tissue death in eight fingers (Tatarewicz 2001). The training schedule had to
continue unabated for the other crew members, and after a rapid recovery Musgrove
rejoined his colleagues in a demanding pre-mission schedule of over 738 hours of
water tank simulations (Tatarewicz 2001), giving the astronauts time to absorb into
the routines necessary for the repair work.
NASA went to enormous lengths to reproduce the environment astronauts would
experience while performing their labour in space. A full sized mock up of the tele-
scope was constructed from helium balloons with the express duty of providing astro-
nauts with a familiar sense of the working environment of outer space.
The success of the repair mission would hinge upon reproducing the conditions
of space here on Earth, in which the astronauts can practice the repair work until it
becomes routine action. The more accustomed the astronauts are with the workshop
of space, achieving mastery of their world through effortless action, the greater the
chances of accomplishing the goals of the mission. The repetitious actions in the train-
ing sessions, using the same tools which will carry out the work but in a simulated
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environment, meant when the work was conducted in space it was not for the first
time and ridden with new disclosures.
The crew needed to display new ways of coping and situational learning to over-
come the problems they were to face. Before the repair mission astronaut Jeff Hoffman
spoke of how the crew would cope with any difficulties. ‘If we run into trouble, we’ll
caucus among ourselves and decide what to do next, regardless of the timelines’
(Chaisson 1994). Due to the extent of repair work, the mission had an extremely tight
schedule of Extra Vehicle Activity over the course of five days, leaving no margin for
error. During one period of work on Hubble crew member Jeff Hoffman has since
spoken about the situated awareness required when a problem arose because the replace-
ment equipment would not fit. After replacing a camera the latches of an instrument
door were refusing to close, this demanded the astronauts to push and pull until
eventually a decision was made to improvise a lasso like strap ‘Ground didn’t quite get
it, they were afraid we were going to collapse Hubble like an aluminium beer can’
(Hoffman – interview, 2008). After consultation with those at mission control it was
decided to trust the astronauts in their work ‘as we were up there in real time where the
action was happening’ (Hoffman – interview 2008). NASA chiefs only had a telepres-
ence of the manoeuvres being orchestrated in space and therefore lacked the situated
awareness available to the astronauts. The NASA people on the ground were basing their
recommendations through a more detached theoretical reflection. This episode demon-
strates the ingenuity needed during human labour in space. When things go wrong in
space the business of rectification is an endeavour fraught with danger.
The completed repairs were a phenomenal success in space, however it required the
verification through use of the telescope, when crew members would be back home to
share the tension of receiving the ‘second light’. Hubble then revealed the focused
image of a distant star as originally anticipated ‘It was as if the human race had been
living in a fog, and that fog was suddenly lifted, revealing the heavens in all their glory’
(Zimmerman 2008, 180). The process of revivification had begun and the real work of
the astronomers could commence, there was immediate excitement about the images
Hubble was capturing and over the coming months and years scientists would regale
in the astonishing discoveries portrayed by the telescopes forays into space.
Coping
The conceptual framework of Heidegger can present an alternative portrayal of the
endeavours carried out by the astronauts. In the following passage Heidegger dis-
cusses the certitude of death and the importance of embracing the nature of finitude
for understanding Dasein’s being-in-the-world.
To expect something possible is always to understand it and ‘have’ it with
regard to whether and when and how it will be actually present at hand.
Expecting is not just an occasional looking away from the possible to its
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possible actualization, but is essential, a waiting for that actualization. Even in
expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a foothold in the actual.
It is for its actuality that what is expected is expected. By the very nature of
expecting, the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out of the actual and
returning to it. (Heidegger 1962, 306 emphasis in original)
All things have a finite existence and if we accept and understand the ‘continuous
dying’ of things around us then management is ready to cope with its consequences and
engineer designs with the provision of serviceability. Hubble has equipmentality as an
array of equipments; nuts, bolts, mirror, solar arrays, computer, all adding up to the
total aggregate of the functioning Hubble Telescope. For the astronauts this will con-
sist of the equipmentality of the shuttle and Hubble – which was fastened together by
a berthing dock – and the platforms, handrails and foot holes that provide a sort of
scaffolding for the space walks and allow the highly trained and conditioned astro-
nauts to display new levels of mutual adjustment and enactment with robotics. This
enactment only became possible through the hours of gruelling training where astro-
nauts were able to gain insight into what the work would demand.
The complete sense we have of our work is not just formed from the monotony
of repetitive tasks but also develops out of our familiarity with the immediate mate-
rial world of work; the structures, tools and objects. Familiarity therefore is an envi-
ronment managers at NASA may benefit from fostering. Training in a Heideggerian
sense is to ‘create our perceptions of another world which is at first unfamiliar, to cre-
ate a particular mode of being. The referential whole is grounded precisely in famil-
iarity, and this familiarity implies that the referential relations are well known’
(Heidegger 1962, 117). Another way of looking at the familiarity of being-in-a-world
training can instil, is the feeling of effortlessness when we are so engrossed in the
activity as to produce a mutual flow with the object of work. For Heidegger this state
of being is termed unthought and means ‘it is not thematically apprehended for delib-
erate thinking about things; instead in circumspection we find our bearings in regard
to the entity. When we encounter the door, we do not apprehend the seats, and the
same holds for the door knob. Nevertheless, they are there in this peculiar way. We
go by them circumspectly, avoid them circumspectly … and the like’ (Dreyfus 1990,
168). When an astronaut goes about their work in space, the levels of absorption they
have endured in simulated environments on Earth makes the repair work second
nature and acquits them with ‘a sense of how the object will show up’ (Heidegger
1962, 233). Such absorbed coping gives the astronaut an advantage when the dealings
occur in a background of familiarity, but this mode of being is insufficient if the
background world of equipment is disturbed, bringing to the fore obtrusiveness –
something is missing or obstinacy – something stands in the way. The stubbornness
of the latches of an instrument door interrupted crew member Hoffman’s course of
action. Its obstinacy required him to change his mode of being from ‘absorbed coping’ to
‘deliberate coping’. The latches ‘in-order-to’ had broken down and its assignment in the
‘referential whole of equipment’ had been disturbed. For Heidegger the scheme peculiar
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to deliberating is the ‘if-then’; ‘if this or that, for instance, is to be produced, put to
use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or opportunities will be
needed’ (Heidegger 1962, 410). Subsequent actions were deliberated and planned.
After detached thinking the astronauts were able to implement their course of action,
to improvise and fudge the door, or kick it shut if need be.
The demise of Hubble
The hostile conditions of space subjected an unimaginable toll upon Hubble’s instru-
mentation. Towards the periods when service missions were required, the telescope
could become completely inoperable. Its materials and parts were tightly coupled in
a complex system exposing them to forces and pressures that undo; its aggregate parts
gradually separated, altering the form and consistency of the telescope. In his work on
ruin and materiality, Edinsor (2005) summarizes the process of ruination with the
following passage ‘things give up their solidity, their form, yielding to the processes
which reveal them as aggregates of matter, erasing their objective boundaries, those
edges which could be felt and looked at and suggested that the object was inviolable
as a discrete entity’ Edinsor (2005, 114). Eventually Hubble was wrestled out of man-
agement’s grasp through the process of decay. Objects do not exist in perpetuity; there
demise is written into their very existence.
With the tragic loss in 2003 of the space shuttle Columbia, and a subsequent sus-
pension of the shuttle programme, Hubble’s future significantly changed. The after-
math had dramatic repercussions for the continued service and therefore future use of
Hubble. The risk to the lives of astronauts while journeying to Hubble was consid-
ered too great. Combined with this setback, Hubble was hit by a parsimonious budg-
etary cycle and revision in space policy under the Bush administration; the chances of
Hubble’s continued existence were receding. It therefore came as no surprise when the
fifth and final Hubble service mission was removed from the 2005 NASA budget.
However the decommissioning of Hubble provoked an emotive response from those
who understood the scientific value it could still contribute. Also for NASA as the
architect of Hubble it was important to hold the fate of the object, thus emphasizing
the ownership and control of its historical trajectory and its power to choose a closing
narrative befitting of what had become its bejewelled spectacle in space. In the end
NASA could not inflict Hubble with such an indecorous finale. The effort that had
already gone into the object meant it had to be a success right until the end and the
respect NASA afforded Hubble with a final service mission was a testament worthy of
its contributions to science. Hubble’s value transcended that of a mere orbiting object,
it was not to be discarded and left to become rubble in space due to fiscal constraints.
The question for management was to decide when its end should arrive. The value of
an object is inseparable from political and managerial motive. Hubble had to con-
stantly compete for funding and justify its scientific value against a host of alternative
space based projects. A plan is now underway to launch another space telescope into
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orbit. The James Webb Telescope is due to venture into space in 2013. It is not a
wholesale replacement of Hubble – it does not have the optical capacity of Hubble –
instead it will use infrared imaging to observe deep space.
After the final service mission due in May 2009, Hubble will be left to wither in
space and gradually shut down. For a while this iconographic symbol of NASA will be
condemned an ignominious resting place among the orbital wasteland of space rubble.
A more reverential end to honour and dignify its service to humanity will come with
an intended 2015 de-orbiting mission; Hubble will become a fireball in a controlled
decent over the oceans of Earth. Maybe this is the poetic ending Hubble deserves; its
better to burn out than fade away.
Releasement
This concluding part will now make one final return to the work of Heidegger to
interpret these closing moments of Hubble’s biography. The planned de-orbiting mis-
sion means Hubble will eventually disappear from management’s view. However
Hubble leaves us something ready to hand that was part of its existence, the knowledge
it has helped produce. For Heidegger ending in the sense of disappearing can still have
its modifications according to the kind of being which an entity may have ‘The rain
is at an end- that is to say it has disappeared. The bread is at an end – that is to say it
has been used up and is no longer available as something ready to hand’ (Heidegger
1962, 417). Through its contribution to knowledge the Hubble project possesses a
dynamic of incompleteness (Knorr Cetnia 2002), which means the definitive ending
of its existence may be difficult to substantiate. Its conclusion is not reached as with
a work of art ‘as the painting is finished with the last stroke of the brush’ (Heidegger
1962, 289). As an ‘epistemic thing’ (Rheinberger 1997), it is an object which has been
involved in the production of knowledge. In a sense Hubble will live on in the knowl-
edge it has given us and the changes it has made to scientific thinking:
one cannot get away from history. Here by history we have in view that which
is past but that which nevertheless is still having effects. The past has a
remarkable double meaning. The past belongs irretrievable to an earlier time,
and in spite of that can still be present at hand now. (Heidegger 1962, 430)
However, Hubble cannot be objectively present forever. In the end objects fade and
are drawn along an unstoppable trajectory to exhaust their existence. All entities share
the same course in their history; their eventual demise ‘Manifestly these “Things”
have altered. The gear has become fragile or worm-eaten “in the course of time”’
(Heidegger 1962, 431). Their assembled connections make the present be felt, joins
and seams are forced apart as entities labour against each other. Service and mainte-
nance are the twin combatants to halt this gradual decline of decay. The episodic serv-
ice missions of Hubble punctuated its timeline and became crucial to the telescopes
continuance; demonstrating an organized resistance against the inexorable effects of
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time. Any manufactured object creates an illusion of permanence, an assembled whole
masks the forces that have gone into its production. A man-made object is exposed to
natures efforts to reclaim the state of things, regaining control of their performance
and refashion them back into the simpler constitutive elements. It is the nature of care
to preserve objects in the structures we have created, bringing to the fore the role of
management in staving of the effects of decay.
As a befitting end to Hubble’s existence Heidegger points us towards how the
power of an entity is founded in the ‘letting be’ which would allow Hubble to articu-
late meaning out of ‘the mysteries’ (Heidegger 1966, 128) beyond its material exis-
tence. Hubble has revealed us beyond our associations with things, and the worlding
of our existence. It has disclosed us as an expression of our history in the Universe. As
Management has disclosed and revealed the entity of Hubble, then the telescope has
also revealed something of the hidden and concealed about our very existence and been
able to tell us something about our place in the universe. This is what Introna calls
‘things naming us’ (Introna 2005). Sometimes humanity is capable of constructing
objects that can look back upon us and reveal our nature of being.
Our projects run down and end, like us. The life of things is not just poetry of
growth, vitality and becoming, but also poetry of loss, decay and finitude – like us.
Do our great projects not name our ongoing desire for transcendence? Do we not
build pyramids, cathedrals, temples and towering office blocks as expressions of
the possibility for overcoming our finitude – inscribing into the flesh of things our
deepest existential desire for a ‘life after death’? (Introna 2005, 7)
With a replacement telescope soon to be launched, in some sense NASA is finally
letting go of Hubble ‘In awaiting the next new thing, it has already forgotten the old
one’ (Heidegger 1962, 419) and is in a position to place its resources into the success
of other projects. Later in his life when writing on technology Heidegger warns of the
dangers of becoming to firmly attached to technological entities ‘suddenly and unaware
we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall into bondage
to them’ (Heidegger 1966, 53). It is the duty of management to choose the time when
it is right for something to fade into the background, to return once more to the back-
drop from which it emerged. Management must be unemotional in its decision
processes and it is only then it is in a position to make a dispassionate decision and be
free to ‘let go of them, let go of them at any time’ (Heidegger 1966, 54). While
acknowledging and paying tribute to what has gone, management is not indebted to
the being of Hubble, it must ‘deny them the right to dominate us, and so to wrap, con-
fuse, and lay waste our nature’ (Heidegger 1966, 54). The final moment of Hubble’s
history is a difficult decision to make. Heidegger’s term of ‘releasement’ is about
detaching ourselves from something. It is not possible for management to remove the
entirety of Hubble’s disclosed nature for it resides in a historicity of relatedness where
its past will always be accessible. However, releasement can represent a way for man-
agement to move on and free itself up for a new becoming, another project which is to
be revealed. In the final act of letting go of Hubble, management performs the duty of
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making a decision about what is not to be managed any more. It has been a story about
management bringing something into view, but now at the end, management must let
go, and turn towards something else.
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